International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Western Europe\u27s International Approach to International Crime by Carlson, Scott & Zagaris, Bruce
Nova Law Review
Volume 15, Issue 2 1991 Article 8
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Western Europe’s International Approach to
International Crime
Scott Carlson∗ Bruce Zagaris†
∗
†
Copyright c©1991 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Western Europe’s International Approach to
International Crime
Scott Carlson and Bruce Zagaris
Abstract
Any sophisticated discussion of criminal law is apt to touch on the
nature of the criminal process itself.
KEYWORDS: international, crime, Western
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Western Europe's International Approach to
International Crime
Scott Carlson*
Bruce Zagaris**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. International Aspects of Crime
Any sophisticated discussion of criminal law is apt to touch on the
nature of the criminal process itself. In so doing, questions should arise
as to how, when, and why the criminal process punishes someone for
engaging in certain types of behavior. Though one will not be able to
find unanimous answers to these questions, in most circumstances, ask-
ing these questions helps to frame the boundaries of the debate.'
That is not to say that the details of this inquiry are readily or
easily defined. In fact, such is clearly not the case. Take, for example,
illicit drug use and trafficking in the United States, and within that
topic focus simply on the role of drug testing in grappling with the drug
problem in the public sector. The issues are legion, and rules and regu-
lations are being regularly challenged in court. The litigants are look-
ing for answers to significant constitutional questions. Does the fourth
or fifth amendment apply? Is "reasonable suspicion" really an issue
any more?2 The answers to these questions will further define the crim-
inal process in this country.
* The author is an Attorney-Advisor with the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author.
** The author is Of Counsel, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Washington,
D.C.; Adjunct Professor of International Business Criminal Law, Fordham University
School of Law; Co-Chair, Committee on International Criminal Law, Section of Crim-
inal Justice, A.B.A.; and Editor-in-Chief of the International Enforcement Law
Reporter.
1. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1-2
(1986).
2. Weeks, Public Employee Drug Testing under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going Under the Federal Decisions?,
20 URB. LAW. 445 (1988).
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However, criminal activity does not recognize national boundaries,
and to be effective, the criminal process must be flexible enough to deal
with this fact. In recent years, Americans have been confounded by the
ability of some criminals to manipulate national boundaries to their ad-
vantage. How can it be that someone who is wanted for trial in the
United States can relax with impunity at his Swiss estate?3
The answer is frustratingly simple. Most of the basic institutions
which Americans rely on to define and improve the criminal process
are nonexistent or extremely limited in the international sphere, for do-
mestic courts and legislatures are, by definition, institutions of limited
authority. To cope with the burgeoning international aspects of crime,
the institutions we rely on must be adapted to operate in the interna-
tional arena.
Years ago, Western European countries identified the shortcom-
ings of a domestic approach to international crime and began taking
steps to remedy the situation.4 To illustrate the European approach,
this paper focuses primarily on Western European developments in the
area of illicit drug use and trafficking. Though progress is being made
in other areas, the European approach to illicit drug use and trafficking
has produced substantial results in the context of international coopera-
tion; and with America's own "War on Drugs" raging, this subject has
particular relevance to the domestic practitioner.
B. New Foreign Policy Considerations
Another reason to examine international cooperation in Western
Europe is that we now live in an era in which the territorial state is
being eclipsed by non-territorial actors such as multinational corpora-
tions, transnational social movements, and intergovernmental organiza-
tions. The politics of global interdependence is inescapable.5
3. Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich, REGARDIES 47 (Feb. 1990).
4. See Abbell, Extradition of Business Crimes to and from European Countries,
A.B.A. Pahel on International Criminal Cooperation in European Business Crimes in a
Rapidly Changing Environment, A.B.A. Nat'l Convention 38, 40 (Aug. 7, 1990). For a
discussion of some recent U.S. efforts to cope with international crime, see Weiland,
Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025 (1986). A sum-
mary of some of the international measures in the 1990 Crime Bill can be found at
Barber & Zagaris, Selected International Enforcement Provisions in the 1990 Crime
Bill, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REi. 401 (1990).
5. See R. KEOHANE AND J. NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE WORLD POLITICS
IN TRANSITION 3-4 (1977).
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In acknowledgement of this fact, criminal policy has been elevated
to one of the priority issues within foreign policy itself. For instance,
the declarations emerging from G-7 summits' have expanded their
scope from economics to terrorism, drugs, and, more recently, money
laundering.7 These criminal problems often arise from international
networks operating outside the control of any single sovereign nation.
The fluid nature of these networks makes it difficult for a single nation
acting independently to combat these criminal problems. In this vein,
modern foreign policy increasingly reflects a situation where unilateral
displays of force play a diminishing role, for traditional instruments of
power cannot deal with these new, more subterranean, threats to inter-,
national political stability which permeate national boundaries.
In this context, international cooperation represents a valuable
new resource in the foreign policy arsenal, offering international solu-
tions to international problems. The section that follows describes one
method of facilitating international cooperation via international re-
gimes. If successful, a regime fosters an ongoing cooperative spirit that
enhances the participating nations' "soft powers."8 The term "soft
power" describes a nation's ability to persuade another to want what it
wants, in contrast to "hard power" which involves one nation ordering
another to do what it wants.9
In an era of multinational actors and concerns, the ability of na-
tions to exercise co-optive or soft power is becoming increasingly im-
portant, for as the mix of resources that define international power
change, so too must countries' approach to the acquisition and manipu-
lation of international power. This lesson is especially important to
countries which have enjoyed considerable influence from a hard power
perspective, such as the United States. These countries must be careful
to hone soft powers with the same vigor that they have devoted to hard
6. The G-7 Summit is an annual meeting of the heads of government of the
leading seven industrial nations (the U.S., Italy, France, the U.K., Japan, Canada and
Germany). The agenda is predominantly economic. The governments involved prepare
the agenda and do a substantial amount of background work. Traditionally, a state-
ment is released at the end of the summits containing agreements on policies reached.
7. See, e.g., Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 153, 164 (1990); Perez, OAS
Opportunities, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 51, 55 (1990); see also Sorensen, Rethinking Na-
tional Security, 69 FOREIGN Am. 1-18 (1990) (discussion of criminal policy in the
context of national security redefinition).
8. See Nye, supra note 7, at 164.
9. Id. at 168.
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powers in the past.10 If they do not, their ability to participate in shap-
ing solutions to current international problems, such as illicit drug use
and trafficking, may be compromised. Moreover, due to the important
role that international regimes play in developing soft powers, an un-
derstanding of regimes is important, if not essential, to nations seeking
to shape these solutions.
In order to illustrate the usefulness of international regimes when
describing international cooperation in criminal matters, section two
defines the term "international regime" and discusses some of the qual-
ities of international regimes. In section three, the Western European
regime of cooperation in international criminal matters is outlined, and
section four then highlights recent developments and prospects for fur-
ther developing and defining European cooperation. The article closes
with some observations on the impact of the Western European regime
of international cooperation both within and without Europe.
II. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES-A FRAMEWORK FOR
COOPERATION
"International regime" is a term from international organization
theory that emerged in the early 1970s.1 The term applies to arrange-
ments that involve mostly government actors, but that affect non-gov-
ernment actors in diverse areas, such as international trade, telecom-
munications, and meteorology. A regime may be formal, like the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or informal where the re-
gime is merely implicit from the actions of the states involved.
Generally, the purpose of international regimes is to regulate and
control certain transnational relations and activities by establishing in-
ternational procedures, rules, and institutions. 2 In fact, international
regimes have been defined as "norms, rules, and procedures agreed to
in order to regulate an issue area. '"13
Thus, it is apparent that international regimes are goal-oriented
enterprises whose participating members seek benefits -through explicit
10. Id. at 171.
11. For an early discussion of "international regimes," see Keohane & Nye,
Transnational Relations and World Politics, INT'L ORG. 25, No. 3 (1971) (later en-
larged and published as a book by Harvard University Press in 1972).
12. R. KEOHANE & J. NYE, supra note 5, at 5.
13. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes, 32
WORLD POL. 357-405 (1980).
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or tacit cooperation based on common concerns. In the case of illicit
drug use and trafficking, these concerns include: reduction in the supply
and demand of illicit narcotics; treatment for persons addicted to nar-
cotics; and diminution of power of the organized narcotics traffickers.
Though international regimes often enjoy the sponsorship of intergov-
ernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, the issues ad-
dressed by international regimes are usually more specific in nature.
Since the emphasis of a regime is on achieving a specific objective, in-
ternational regimes are considered to be more flexible in nature and
more likely to undergo evolutionary change than IGOs. 4
If an international regime is successful, it maintains or reduces the
cost of legitimate transactions while increasing the costs of illegitimate
ones such as money laundering and drug trafficking. In the rapidly
changing global marketplace and political scene, a premium is placed
on an international regime's ability to meet new developments head-on.
This challenge makes it an important function of the international re-
gime to facilitate ongoing negotiations among governments. 15
In the following section, this article generally outlines the interna-
,tional-regime of cooperation in criminal matters that is emerging in
Europe. Typically, there are several approaches used to discuss and de-
scribe international regimes. These approaches can range in emphasis
between an historical to a functional approach."" However, due to space
limitations, this article will not follow a particular doctrinal approach
in the interest of developing a general and accessible outline of the
regime.
III. THE EUROPEAN REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The following discussion is framed in terms of the European Com-
munities and the Council of Europe. These organizations do not com-
pletely define the boundaries of the international regime, but they are
14. W. FELD & R. JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 40 (1983).
15. For additional background on the iniportance of international regimes to gov-
ernmental actors like the United States, see AFTER HEGEMONY, COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (1984); see also KEOHANE, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141-72 (Keohane ed.
1983).
16. See generally W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14. For an example of the
historical approach, focusing on alcohol and narcotics, see Nadelman, Global Prohibi-
tion Regimes, 44 INT'L ORG. 479-526 (1990).
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two of the regime's most significant components, and their activities
illustrate the general outline of the regime.
Though neither organization specializes in criminal matters, both
possess an international institutional framework for the ongoing regula-
tion and control of transnational relations, and both have dealt with
international criminal matters. As noted earlier, international regimes
are defined by their rules and procedures. Therefore, the following dis-
cussion describes not only the results of international cooperation in
criminal matters, but also the means used to achieve those results.
A. The European Communities
The term "European Communities" refers to the limited federalist
system established between Western European countries through trea-
ties of the 1950s. 17 The Communities comprise four main institutions:
the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament, and the
Court of Justice. The Council and the Commission bear the primary
responsibility for producing legislation.18 The Commission is responsi-
17. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. "European Communities" refers to three
communities that were officially linked in 1967 with the ratificaticn of the merger
treaty. The three communities are the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom). J. Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 9 (1980). Presently, the
member states of the European Communities are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.
18. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMU-
NITY LAW 3 (1983). The three binding acts that the Council and the Commission may
issue, regulations, directives, and decisions, are set forth in article 189:
In order to carry out their task the Council and Commission shall in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national au-
thorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 189; see also OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
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ble for preparing the initial legislative proposal, and the Council enacts
the legislation into law. In the interim between its proposal and its en-
actment, the legislation is reviewed by the Council, Commission, and
Parliament where opinions and amendments are offered.19 Once the
legislation is enacted, it is binding on the member states, and questions
of interpretation are resolved with the assistance of the Court of
Justice.20
Originally the Community system was quite limited in scope, deal-
ing primarily with the goal of economic integration.21 However, with
the promulgation of the Single European Act in the late 1980s broader
issues surfaced in the Community agenda-most notably the goal of
European unity among the member states.2 In title II of the Act, the
widely touted date of 1992 was set as the target date for completion of
an internal market without trade barriers, and toward that goal the Act
granted the Council greater authority to enact legislation.23
Prior to the Single European Act, it was simply conventional wis-
dom that the European Communities had little if any competence to
grapple with criminal law issues.24 Thus, the member states were left to
TIES 331 (1978) (In light of differences in translation, the documents published by the
European Communities are treated as authoritative for the purposes of this paper.).
19. Good, Institutional Reform under the Single European Act, 3 A.U.J. INr'L
L. & POL'Y 299, 311-12 (1988).
20. In the words of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice "ensure[s] the obser-
vance of law and justice in the interpretations and applications of this treaty." EEC
Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 164. The Court of Justice has consistently taken a pro-
gressive and pragmatic approach in this regard. See Recent Development, European
Economic Community--The Use of Article 173(2) of the EEC Treaty to Contest Ac-
tions of the European Parliament, Partie Ecologiste 'Les Verts' (the Greens) v. Euro-
pean Parliament [1987], 2 COMMON MKT. L. Rnv. 343 (1986), 18 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 85 (1988). Not only does the Court of Justice have primary jurisdiction over
certain matters, such as disputes between member states & Community institutions,
but also the Court has the authority to issue "preliminary rulings." These rulings are
binding responses to requests for assistance from domestic courts or tribunals for assis-
tance in interpreting a question of Community Law. EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at
arts. 170, 177.
21. EEC Treaty, supra note 17, at art. 2.
22. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUnTIES, SINGLE EUROPEAN Acr 2
(Supp. 1986). For an overview of the changes wrought by the Single European Act, see
Good, supra note 19.
23. Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European Act, 23 IIr'L LAw. 549, 552
(1989).
24. Bridge, The European Communities and the Criminal Law, CIM. L. REv.
88 (1976); VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Criminal Law and the European Communities: De-
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administer all criminal matters. This fact proved especially troubling in
the context of Community commercial policy, for along with the Com-
munity's payment of premiums, subsidies, and refunds, there invariably
arose questions of abuse and fraud. To complicate matters, some
crimes are only punishable at the national level under certain circum-
stances. For instance, obtaining financial aid under false pretenses in
many member states is only punishable when against national interest,
and it is possible that a similar crime against Community interests
would go unpunished.25 Prosecution for crimes against the Community
is sometimes referred to as indirect enforcement when the prosecution
is conducted at the member state level. The limitations of this approach
are obvious, for some states have been more diligent than others when
it comes to criminalizing acts against the Communities.28
During the 1970s, the countries of the European Communities
considered ways to improve this system of indirect enforcement. Their
efforts resulted in two draft conventions establishing new offenses
against Community interests. One of the conventions criminalized cer-
tain offenses against financial interests of the Community, and the sec-
ond dealt with the criminal responsibility of Community civil servants.
Both drafts were discussed, but not ratified.27
Though no broad expansion of substantive criminal law at the
Community level appears immediate, the marketplace that each of the
member states operates within is expanding and changing rapidly. Ba-
sically, the Single European Act has made progress towards a Euro-
pean economic union a priority without directly addressing collateral
issues in substantive criminal law. This state of affairs has led some to
conclude that 1992 may prove to be a boon to sophisticated criminals.2 8
fining Issues, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 247 (1983); Har-
ding, The European Communities and Control of Criminal Business Activities, 31
COMP. L.Q. 255 (1982).
25. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, supra note 24, at 247-48. The authority for Commu-
nity payments in this area is set forth in the EEC Treaty. See EEC Treaty, supra note
17, at arts. 39 & 40.
26. B. ZAGARIS & A. FANTAUZZI, European Integration and International Crim-
inal Law, 1 1992 THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION 9 (No. 11,
1989).
27. Zagaris & Fantauzzi, Application of Foreign Criminal Laws to U.S. Busi-
nesses Abroad, 1 INT'L Q. 126 (October 1989).
28. M. BORNHEIM & B. ZAGARIS, International Cooperation Against Money
Laundering in the European Integration Context, 1 1992 THE EXTiERNAL IMPACT OF
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION 13 (No. 15, 1989).
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With the free circulation of goods, services, and capital, criminals will
have an easier time moving operations and capital from country to
country. 9
Nevertheless, preparations for 1992 have not wholly overlooked
the criminal element in the member states, and the Community institu-
tions have been taking an active role in defining Community policy in
this regard. The following subsections describe briefly some of the most
recent and significant efforts of these institutions to further define the
criminal process at the Community level.
1. The European Parliament
In 1985, the Parliament set up a Committee of Enquiry to look
into the Community drug problem. This committee enjoyed a broad
base of support from parties across the political spectrum. Upon con-
cluding their inquiry, the Committee issued a report. The aim of the
report was to set forth a basic understanding of the facts of the situa-
tion upon which to base proposals for improving both the short and
long term outlook within the Community.
30
The Committee discovered that the 1970s and 1980s saw a rise of
serious proportions in hard drug use. At the time of the report, it was
estimated that as many as 1.5 million people in the Community were
regular users of heroin. Accompanying this increase in drug use are
other more sinister and subterranean developments. The Committee
noted that drug traffickers and criminal organizations are emerging in
strength. In the words of the Committee, "[tihe activities of these orga-
nizations constitute an unprecedented attack on national and interna-
tional social order." 31 In the face of this problem, the Committee con-
cluded that the European Community suffered from a lack of
coordination exacerbated by the absence of any strategic roadmap for
the future.32
Developing an adequate strategy would be no easy task, the Com-
29. According to Bank of Italy Governor, Carlo Agzelio Campi, the Mafia has
billions of dollars waiting to be laundered and converted into various investments. Id;
see also Parmelee, European Unity: An Offer the Mafia Can't Refuse, Wash. Post,
May 19, 1989, at Fl, col 5.
30. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COM-
MITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO THE DRUGS PROBLEM IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COM-
MUNITY 12 (1987) [hereinafter ENQUIRY].
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id.
1991]
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mittee conceded-especially in the substantive legal realm. Section IV
of their report was devoted entirely to discussing some of the broad
legal issues that demand Community-wide attention. The beginning of
the section framed the discussion by raising a fundamental, if not con-
trolling, concern: the wide variation in laws and penalties found in the
criminal systems of the member states.33 Within this topic, the Com-
mittee focused on four significant aspects: sentencing, extradition,
freezing of assets, and money laundering. 4
During the discussion the Committee made the following recom-
mendations: 1) the Community address the issue of sentencing through
harmonization of member states law or by adopting a "Community po-
sition" on the subject; 2) extradition be dealt with by the adoption of a
multilateral European agreement;35 3) seizure and freezing of assets be
addressed by "common legislation across the community" with the
seized assets to be used directly to combat the problem; and 4) the
European Commission address money laundering by publishing guide-
lines, and issuing a directive requiring currency transaction reporting."
In addition, the report identified the need for a Community computer
database to house relevant information.37
2. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities
Though the Council of Ministers has not fully addressed all the
points raised by the extensive report of the European Parliament's
33. Id. at 44. "The matter is complicated by the fact that Napoleonic and Com-
mon Law exist in different countries within the Community. In addition the individual
constitutions of some countries make it difficult to apply certain laws across the Com-
munity." Id.
34. ENQUIRY, supra note 29, at 45. However, the report acknowledged the
broader reach of the subject: "Throughout it will be important to ensure as far as
humanly possible that the law is applied in equal measure in all countries of the Com-
munity." Id.
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id. at 46-47. Basically, such an arrangement would be a European version of
the International Currency Control Authority suggested in the And -Drug Abuse Act
and the Interpol working group resolution of April 21, 1989. M. BORNHEIM & B.
ZAGARIS, supra note 28, at 14. Note that some countries, such as Itily, have expressed
reservations about detailed currency transaction reporting. Id. For an overview of some
recent U.S. activity in this area, see Plambeck, The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69 (1988).
37. Id. at 57-58. See also ICC, EC to Establish European Drug Intelligence
Unit, COM. CRIME INT'L 1 (1989).
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Committee of Enquiry, it has taken steps toward improving interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters within the European Communi-
ties. In May of 1987, the Ministers of Justice met in Brussels. This
Council of Ministers clearly expressed a resolve to tackle some of the
problems facing the European Communities in cooperation in criminal
matters. Specifically, the Council reminded the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities of the urgent need to accelerate international le-
gal cooperation in criminal matters. According to the Council, this in-
creased cooperation is necessary to facilitate the development of a
"European legal area" as envisioned, by the Single European Act.3 8
The Council went on to discuss and endorse specific developments.
In particular, the Council applauded the member states signing the
conventions on the transfer of sentenced persons and double jeopardy. 9
Also, the Council examined possible reforms that can be made to the
extradition process.40 Though the scope of the above developments was
limited, recent developments indicate the Council is willing to expand
the range of issues it will address.4 1 This trend is both promising and
necessary if there is to be a European legal area.
3. The Commission of the European Communities
In addressing international crime, the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities has been active in both its capacity as an advisor
and as an initiator of legislation. Indeed, they have addressed these
matters both within and without the Communities.
In a seminal proposal on November 26, 1986, the Commission out-
lined a broad program to combat the growing drug problem.42 The pur-
pose of the program was to "initiate an ongoing dialogue between the
member states and the Commission aimed at identifying the priorities
38. Council of the European Communities, Press Release 1167th Council Meet-
ig 5 (1987) [hereinafter Press Release].
39. Id. at 6. For a more detailed treatment of the double jeopardy issue, see
1983-1984 EUtR. PARL. Doc. (No.1-1397/83), Report of the Legal Affairs Committee
(1984).
40. Press Release, supra note 38, at 6-7.
41. Zagaris & Fantauzzi, Breaking the Connection, 34 SEC. MGmT. 46, 49 (June
1990). In May of 1989, an informal meeting of the Council witnessed the opening for
signature of an European Community convention on international criminal cooperation.
Fantauzzi, EEC Ministers of Justice Meet on International Criminal Cooperation, 5
INT'L ENFORCEmENT L. REP. 220-21 (June 1989).
42. Fight Against Drugs in the Community, BULL. OF EuR. COMM. 8 (1986).
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and areas in which cooperation is essential if the fight against drug
addiction is to succeed. ' 43 The Commission's proposal was a follow-up
to factfinding activities like those of the European Parliament discussed
earlier."
With similar vigor, the Commission has pursued the matter exter-
nally. In 1987, the United Nations Convention Against [llicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was negotiated.4' Follow-
ing its completion, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council
of Ministers decision on the signing of the Convention.' 6
More recently, the Commission has begun to aggressively pursue
specific proposals geared toward internal structural changes needed in
light of 1992. On February 10, 1989, the Commission issued the propo-
sal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/799/EEC concern-
ing mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the member
states in the field of direct taxation and value-added tax.47 The propo-
sal mandated the development of national legislation which would abol-
ish restrictions on the exchange of information due to administrative
practices.48
These efforts complement new anti-fraud measures proposed by
the European Commission. Here too the management of information is
essential for law enforcement. Managing common commercial policies,
such as the Common Agricultural Policy, has proven intricate, and the
coordination of accounting controls among the member states is an es-
sential step if 1992 is to be met without encouraging wholesale fraud.49
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See United Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, Corr. 1 and
Corr. 2, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
46. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision,
Jan. 26, 1989.
47. Reprinted in EC Prepares International Tax Enforcement Strategy, 5 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 297 (Aug. 1989).
48. Id. Also in preparation for a single capital market, a formal proposal was
issued considering a Community-wide 15% withholding tax on interest income. This
too would involve an increased rate of exchange of tax information. See Liberalizing
EC Capital Movements at the Price of Tax Avoidance, 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
50 (Feb. 1989).
49. Morris, EC Finance Ministers Discuss New Anti-Fraud Proposals, 5 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 268-69 (July 1989). However, these anti-fraud efforts have yet
to fully address the problem. See Zagaris, EC Court of Auditors Report Indicates
Fraud in EC Export Refund System, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 267 (July 1990).
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Both of the areas mentioned above, exchange of information in tax
matters and accounting controls, fall within the predominantly com-
mercial matters where the European Communities' competence is tra-
ditionally asserted. A more controversial step this year was the Com-
mission's proposal for a directive which focused on preventing the
Community financial system from being used for money laundering.50
The proposal, if realized, would call on credit and financial institutions
to scrutinize transactions, challenging them when the true identity of
the customer is in doubt or no economic and lawful purpose appears
present. Moreover, the institutions would be required to notify law en-
forcement authorities on their own initiative.51
B. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was formed on August 3, 1949, when the
Statute of the Council of Europe went into effect.52 The signatories
came together with the understanding "that the pursuit of peace based
upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation
of human society and civilisation." 53 There are two principal organs of
the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers and the Consulta-
tive Assembly. 4
The Council of Europe, through its organs, investigates matters of
importance to its members, and in some cases issues recommendations
to its members. The Consultative Assembly deliberates and debates
matters within its competence, and presents its conclusions to the Com-
mittee of Ministers.55 The Consultative Assembly may, when appropri-
ate, establish committees and commissions to consider and report on
For an example of the fraud problem, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
50. Nilsson, European Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters, A.B.A. Panel on
International Criminal Cooperation in European Business Crimes in a Rapidly Chang-
ing Environment, A.B.A. Nat'l Convention, Aug. 7, 1990, at 3, 19.
51. Id. at 20.
52. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Aug. 3, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103
[hereinafter STATUTE OF nE COUNCIL].
53. Id. at Preamble. The 12 members of the European Communities are als'o
members of the Council of Europe.
54. Id. at art. 10. The Council sits in Strasbourg. Id. at art. 11.
55. Id. at art. 22. The Assembly consists of representatives selected by the re-
spective national parliaments. Id. at art. 25. Its competence is rather broad except that
it does not deal with issues of national defense and should not interfere with the work
of international organizations. See id. at art. 23.
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specific matters.5 6 Upon receiving the recommendation of the Consulta-
tive Assembly, the Committee of Ministers considers what action
would further the goals of the Council of Europe. The Committee may
also examine matters and issue conclusions on its own motion. In its
conclusions the Committee is free to put forth a range of options, in-
cluding the adoption of international agreements and common
policies. 17 .
In this manner the Council has been actively addressing interna-
tional components of the criminal process. Historically, their approach
has been pragmatic. For instance, noting that the territoriality principle
of jurisdiction did not adequately address the transborder elements of
modern criminal activity, the Council promoted the 1964 Road Traffic
Convention which departed from the territoriality approach.58 Not only
does it allow the state of residence to prosecute, at the request of the
state of offense, an offense on the latter's territory, but also the state of
residence is permitted, at the request of the state of offense, to enforce
foreign judgements of the latter. 9
While the Council has maintained a progressive approach to trans-
border criminal activity, the member governments have lagged behind
in the area of conventions. For example, only a handful of governments
have ratified the 1964 Road Traffic Convention. Some have concluded
that the reason for this is that member governments were not alarmed
enough by the spread of crime. 1
However, recent developments in the area of conventions give rea-
son to be optimistic, and progress has been made in areas outside of the
signing of conventions. The following subsections describe some of
these promising developments.
56. Id. at art. 24.
57. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 52, at art. 15(a). "In appropriate
cases, the conclusions of the Committee may take the form of recommendations to the
Governments of Members, and the Committee may request the Governments of Mem-
bers to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such recommendations."
Id. at art. 15(b).
58. See Muller-Rappard, The European System, II INT'L CraM. L. 95, 100-101
(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
59. Of course, the aforesaid provisions only apply to offenses hat are related to
road traffic. Id.
60. Id. at 110-11.
61. Id. at 97-98.
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1. Cooperation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking in Drugs-The'Pompidou Group
The Pompidou Group was formed in 1971 at the suggestion of
Georges Pompidou, President of the French Republic, to his colleagues
in Western Europe. The Group undertook to examine, from a multidis-
ciplinary point of view, the problems of drug trafficking and abuse. The
Group does not have the official character of an international organiza-
tion, but it has conducted its activities since 1980 under the auspices of
the Council of Europe. 2
In the spring of 1980, the Committee of Ministers sanctioned an
agreement for operating the Pompidou Group within the Council of
Europe. Under this agreement, governments outside the Council of Eu-
rope may join with the unanimous agreement of the Group members.
Still others, like the United States, have begun to participate on an ad
hoe basis.6 The members are represented at ministerial meetings by
the appropriate minister from the member's government.
Like the European Parliament, the Pompidou Group has proven
adept at gathering information. On September 12 and 13, 1984, the
Seventh Ministerial Conference met in Paris where it was decided that
the Group should examine cooperation between the criminal justice
system and social/health services. A subsequent working group pro-
62. Council of Europe, A Brief Description of the Activities of the Pompidou
Group and Its'Establishment within the Framework of the Council of Europe 1, Oct.
4, 1989, P-PG(88) Inf. 1.
63. Id.
The original members of the Group were Belgium, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden were subsequently ad-
mitted to the Group. Turkey joined the Group when the Partial Agree-
ment was established by the Council of Europe in March 1980. Since then
Greece became a member in 1981, Norway in 1983, Spain in 1984, Portu-
gal and Switzerland in 1985, Finland in 1987, Austria on 1 January 1988,
Malta on 1 April 1988 and Cyprus on 1 October 1989 bringing the num-
ber of member states to 20.
Certain countries which are not members of the Council of Europe
participate in some activities of the Group on a technical ad hoc basis, for
example, Canada, the United States, and the Holy See.
In addition since May 1986, the Commission of the European Com-
munities takes part in the Group's work with a view to ensuring coordina-
tion of the two organizations' activities.
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posed that two symposia be held on the subject.6 4 The: first, held on
October 29 and 31, 1986, collected a wealth of informat.on on the sub-
ject, cataloguing differences among the members in pros;ecution, treat-
ment,65 sanctions, et cetera.6 The second, geared towards rehabilita-
tion issues, was held on December 1 through 4, 198 7 .61 Though such
broad based symposia are not a frequent occurrence, the Pompidou
Group's factfinding efforts have been maintained over the years, and
the Group continues to keep track of developments between and within
Group members.68
Their factfinding activities are complemented by their efforts to
coordinate international measures to combat the drug problem. Often,
these efforts focus on developing international agreements. 9 For in-
stance, the Eighth Ministerial Conference noted that a convention or
multilateral agreement would be useful in dealing with drug trafficking
in international waters and the confiscation of dr-ug trafficking
proceeds.7"
Regarding drug trafficking, the Group has proven especially per-
sistent. In a Political Declaration at the Extraordinary Ministerial Con-
ference in May of 1989, the Group "urged that the current work in the
Council of Europe on the preparation of a European Convention on the
search, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds from crime be expe-
dited.171 The Group noted that international cooperation is essential for
progress because criminal activity in this area has reached new levels of
64. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SYMPOSIUM ON DRUG MISUSERS IN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEEDINGS: A DIFFICULT BALANCE BETWEEN PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 3 (1987).
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 116.
67. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SYMPOSIUM ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
SOCIAL REHABILITATION MEASURES FOR DRUG MISUSERS (1988).
68. E.g., Council of Europe, Background Document on the Cocaine Threat in
Europe, P-PG/MIN (89) 2 Revised (1989), Extraordinary Ministerial Conference,
London 18-19 May 1989; Council of Europe, Background Paper on HIV/AIDs and
Addiction, P-PG/MIN (89) 4 Revised (1989), Extraordinary Mini;terial Conference,
London 18-19, May 1989.
69. Council of Europe, Declaration of the 8th Ministerial Conference, (1987) P-
PG/MIN (86) 5 Def., 8th Ministerial Conference, London 20-21, Jan. 1987.
70. Id.
71. Council of Europe, Political Declaration of the Extraordinary Ministerial
Conference in London May 18-19 4, (1989) P-PG/MIN (89) 5 Def. The declaration
went on to note that "[w]hen adopted this convention would provide a suitable frame-
work for international, intra-European cooperation." Id.
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sophistication.72 Though earlier ad hoc technical conferences had pro-
vided some of the foundation for developing a convention to address the
situation, the convention itself was slow to follow.73 The Group noted
that in this field, "there is no long-standing tradition of working coop-
eration. 17 4 In addition, current national legislation on the subject was
woefully inadequate to cope with the problem. However, the Group was
optimistic about the prospects for the future, noting that national dif-
ferences on the subject were often matters of form more than sub-
stance.75 The Group urged that members maintain a "steady momen-
tum in developing international action."7 6
The optimism of the Group was not unwarranted, for in June of
1990, the Council of Europe's European Committee on Crime
Problems adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.77 Even more surprising was
the fact that on November 8, 1990, the first day it was open for signa-
ture, twelve governments signed the Convention."8
2. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
Though the Convention was drafted with drug offenses particu-
larly in mind, it was drafted broadly so that it addresses all types of
criminality. Parties to the Convention will enjoy cooperation in the ar-
eas of investigation, search, and seizure in such diverse areas as arms
dealing and trafficking in children.79 The Explanatory Report to the
72. Council of Europe, Background Paper on Confiscation of the Proceeds of
Drug Trafficking at the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference in London May 18-19,
1989 2, (1989) P-PG/MIN (89) 3.
73. In 1983 and 1985, the Group held these technical conferences, but it was not
until 1987 that the Council of Europe's European Committee on Crime Problems offi-
cially took up the matter. Id.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Council of Europe, Draft Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, adopted at Strasbourg July 25, 1990, CDPC
(90) 17 Addendum I [hereinafter COE Convention].
78. The governments which signed were Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Zagaris, Twelve Countries Sign European Laundering Convention, 6 INT'L
ENFORCEmENT L. REP. 380 (Nov. 1990).
79. Council of Europe, Draft Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laun-
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Convention noted that the broad sweep of the Convention would re-
quire some states to make substantial amendments to their domestic
legislation in order to become parties to the Convention.81, However, the
experts drafting the Convention considered that the somewhat strict
obligations of the Convention would be operating within a group of
like-minded states so a certain spirit of cooperation would prevail.81
Moreover, in the same vein, the drafters left out the word "European"
in hopes that "like[-]minded states outside the framework of the Coun-
cil of Europe" would choose to participate.82
a. Chapter I-The Use of Terms
Chapter I sets out some of the basic terms utilized in the Conven-
tion. Article L.a. defines "proceeds" to mean "any economic advantage
from criminal offences." 8 This broad construction of the term includes
assets and property that may be held by third parties.84 Similarly, arti-
cle 1.b. gives a broad definition of "property." It defines the term to
include "property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing
title to, or interest in such property."8' 5 The "confiscation" of the afore-
said is phrased in terms of a "penalty or a measure, ordered by a court
following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or criminal
offences." 8 6
The prevailing consideration behind Chapter I was to structure the
scope of the Convention to be as wide as possible in principle. Any
offense that produces huge profits might fall within the ambit of this
chapter; examples include environmental offenses, insider trading, and
economic fraud. 7 Realizing that the extensive nature of this Conven-
tion might cause delays in ratification, the drafters provided that reser-
vations to certain subsequent provisions could be made by way of
dering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, Strassbourg, July
6, 1990, CDPC (90) 17 Addendum II, para. 8 [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
80. See id.
81. See id. at para. 14.
82. Id. at para. 18. In fact Australia, Canada, and the United States participated
in the drafting and are three such "like[-]minded states." Id.
83. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 1.
84. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 21.
85. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 1.b.
86. Id. at art. 1.d.
87. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 27.
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declaration.8
b. Chapter II-Measures to be Taken at the National Level
Generally, Chapter II prescribes the legal infrastructure that sig-
natories will need to implement the Convention. The articles of this
chapter list measures that the parties "shall adopt."8 9
Articles two, three, and four deal with confiscation, investigative
and provisional measures, and special investigative powers and tech-
niques, respectively. As in Chapter I, the approach of these articles is
broad in scope. For example, confiscation is to be permitted both of
specific items and items of equivalent value,90 and provisional measures
must be developed to identify and prevent the disposition of these
items.91 However, unlike Chapter I, reservations to article two were
permitted insofar as the categories of covered offenses is concerned, 92
though it was anticipated that parties would do so sp'aringly. 93
The need for such reservations is further minimized by the inclu-
sion of article five. This article calls on parties to insure that the rights
of innocent parties are preserved.9 The provision implies that parties
should be given an opportunity to be heard in court with the assistance
of counsel.95
The final article of the chapter, article six, establishes an obliga-
tion to criminalize money laundering.9 6 Furthermore, to the extent that
it is not contrary to a party's constitution or basic legal concepts,
criminalization of "money laundering" should include the knowing use
or possession of "proceeds" or aiding and abetting in the commission of
money laundering. 7 Again, reservations are permitted insofar as the
88. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 2.2.
89. E.g., COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 2.1. But see id. at art. 4.2.
(dealing with special investigative techniques such as wiretapping and stating, "[e]ach
party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary
.") (emphasis added).
90. Id. at art. 2.1; see also id. at art. 13; Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at
para. 48.
91. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 3.
92. Id. at art. 2.2.
93. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 27.
94. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 5.
95. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 31.
96. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 6.1.
97. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 32.
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categories of covered offenses is concerned, 98 but it should be noted
that reservations under this article are independent of any in article
two.9
9
c. Chapter III-International Cooperation
Building on the foundation laid by the first two chapters, Chapter
III sets forth the obligations and procedures needed to connect interna-
tionally the national measures described by the previous chapter. This
chapter is divided into sections with each section addressing a general
topic elaborated upon through the articles therein.
Section one describes the guiding principles to be used in constru-
ing the sections that follow.1°0 Article 7.1. states the general rule that
"[p]arties shall cooperate with each other to the widest extent possible
.... 1U01 To do so, article 7.2. mandates that parties "shall adopt" any
needed legislation to provide the international linkage to comply with
requests for assistance from another party.102 Though phrased expan-
sively, the Explanatory Report makes clear that this section is defined
by the parameters of the Convention; thus, for example, "fishing expe-
ditions," which are not contemplated by the Convention, do not fall
within the obligation to cooperate.103
What does fall within the obligation to cooperate is further defined
quite specifically in sections two,1°4 three,105 and four, 08 which deal
with investigative assistance, provisional measures, and cAnfiscation, re-
spectively. The initial article of each section requires the requested
party to comply with a request from the requesting party.107 Later arti-
cles in each of the sections provide that the request will be executed in
accordance with the domestic legislation of the requested party.108
98. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 6.4.
99. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 34.
100. Id. at para. 35.
101. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 7.1.
102. Id. at art. 7.2.
103. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 35. "If the requesting party
has no indication of where the property might be found, the requested party is not
obligated to search, for instance, all banks in the country; cf. Article 27, paragraph
l(e)(ii) [sic]." Id.
104. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 8.
105. Id. at art. 11.
106. Id. at art. 13.
107. See supra notes 93-95.
108. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 9, 12, 14.
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However, the execution of the request via domestic machinery does not
mean that the grounds for a request are always subject to a de novo
review. For example, when the competent authorities of a requesting
state have determined the factual basis for a confiscation request, the
competent authorities of the requested state should not then re-try the
facts. Rather, the requested authorities should respect the decision of a
competent foreign authority. 10 9
Despite these strict obligations, a requested state may still refuse
to cooperate, citing one of the grounds listed in section five, Refusal
and Postponement of Cooperation. The grounds listed here range from
sovereignty interests110 to a de minimis exception where a sum to be
confiscated will not outweigh the expense of confiscation.,1 Though the
drafters concede that this section gives a requested state broad leeway
to refuse a request, they stress that it nevertheless places some restric-
tions on refusal. 112
Assuming cooperation is present, the issue of the rights of third
parties may arise. Section six, Notification and Protection of Third
Parties' Rights, deals with providing notice and an opportunity to be
heard.113 This section coordinates and secures the rights of third par-
ties. As a general proposition, the rights of third parties may be ad-
dressed in either the requesting or requested state. However, the actual
forum will be decided on the basis of procedural considerations particu-
lar to the parties involved. 4
Section seven is the final section of this chapter, entitled Proce-
dural and Other General Rules. The section sets out basic procedures
to administer the international cooperation. These provisions address
generally such matters as the format of the request, 115 to whom it
should be addressed, 1  confidentiality,1 1 7 and costs.118
109. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 52.
110. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 18.b.
111. Id. at art. 18.c; see also Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 62.
112. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 58.
113. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 21, 22.
114. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 81; see also COE Convention,
supra note 77, at art. 30 (obligating a party who refuses to cooperate to give reasons
for refusing).
115. COE Convention, supra note 77, at arts. 25, 27. These provisions are some-
what detailed covering translations, content, and methods of communication. Id.
116. Id. at arts. 23, 24.
117. Id. at art. 33.
118. Id. at art. 34.
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d. Chapter IV-Final Provisions
Most of the provisions in Chapter IV are model clauses used by
the Council of Europe.129 These provisions cover reservations,'120 acces-
sion, 2I ratification, 2 et cetera.
The one notable exception is article forty-one, dealing with amend-
ments. Unlike other penal law conventions concluded in the Council of
Europe, this provision allows for minor amendments without the neces-
sity of protocols.12 3
Lastly, it should be noted that provisions for dispute settlement are
not specifically prescribed. A standard list of possible methods for dis-
pute resolution is offered, leaving it to the parties to decide upon a
particular method by agreement. 24
IV. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN REGIME
This section elaborates on some of the developments mentioned in
the previous section, and introduces others. The subsections that follow
point out areas and proposals that, if pursued and ratified, will expand
and further define the scope of the European regime of international
cooperation in criminal matters.
A. The European Communities
1. Directive on Money Laundering
On December 17, 1990, the Council of Economic and Finance
Ministers (ECOFIN Council) agreed on a common position for a direc-
tive to address money laundering' 25 The directive, if finalized would go
into effect January 1, 1993, calling on member states to make launder-
119. Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 93.
120. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 40.
121. Id. at art. 37.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id. at art. 41. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 79, at para. 96.
124. COE Convention, supra note 77, at art. 42.
125. Zagaris, EC Finance Ministers Reach Agreement on a Money Laundering
Directive, 6 INr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 432 (Dec. 1990). The position was reached
after discussion of the Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, March 23, 1990, COM (90)
106 final SYN 254.
[Vol. 15
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/8
Carlson and Zagaris
ing drug trafficking proceeds a criminal offense."26
Though the draft directive initially only requires action in the
realm of drug proceeds, it also allows member states the option of ap-
plying this convention to other areas such as terrorism and kidnapping.
Furthermore, it calls for the establishment of a working party to ex-
amine the possibility of uniformly extending the directive to other crim-
inal activities. 27 Supplementing the substantive requirements of the di-
rective are procedural provisions. In this regard, financial and credit
institutions would be subject to certain reporting requirements, includ-
ing a duty to report suspicious transactions.
However, the most significant aspect of this draft is the manner in
which it deals with the question of the Communities' limited jurisdic-
tion. It provides that member states take all necessary measures to im-
plement the provision, including participation in a multilateral declara-
tion in which it is agreed that penal sanctions will apply to credit and
financial institutions which refuse to comply with the directive. This
approach is to counter objections that criminal law is outside the scope
of Community law, for the penal sanctions themselves would be a re-
quirement of an extra-Community agreement. In a similar vein, it is
contemplated that some of the new democracies in Eastern Europe may
be able to associate themselves with the agreement.128
2. European Communities as International Actor
The European Communities, as an entity, has participated in ne-
gotiations at the international level. As noted earlier, the United Na-
tions Drug Convention is one example.1 29 Whether the Commission's
proposal for a Council decision on the Convention will be fol-
lowed-and to what extent it will create obligations on the member
states-remains uncertain. However, if the Council does issue a bind-
ing decision, the mere fact that the Communities will be taking such a
position on the Convention demonstrates potential for future interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters at the Community level.
In addition, Community level cooperation is evident in other areas
outside of treaty negotiations. Two notable examples of this cooperation
126. For additional background, see Kellaway, Agreement to Outlaw Laundering
of Money in the Community, Fin. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at 20, col.5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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are the Communities' participation in Interpol and the Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices. Both of these
organizations have adopted rules or declarations on the subject of mon-
itoring suspicious financial transactions.130 By participating and ex-
changing views on the subject, the Communities will be able to further
hone internal policy on the same subjects.
B. Council of Europe's Influence on Non-Member States
A consequence of the Council of Europe's involvement in the inter-
national regime is that human rights are given added attention, for in
article three of the Statute of the Council, there is the requirement that
members of the Council "accept the principles of the rule of law and of
the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 13 ' Though this obligation is addressed to mem-
bers of the Council of Europe, its influence reaches non-members.
In this regard, the Council of Europe is monitoring the human
rights situation in Eastern Europe. The new democracies in Eastern
Europe that want to join the Council will have to demonstrate the nec-
essary respect for human rights. Implicit in such a demonstration is a
criminal process that respects human rights. Furthermore, the same
measures that secure human rights domestically can also be expected
to foment international cooperation in criminal matters: for in the
Western European regime, provisions for human rights are often a fac-
tor, if not a prerequisite, to international cooperation in criminal
matters.132
Already, Eastern European countries have demonstrated an eager-
ness to accept advice and training on certain criminal .justice policies,
such as white collar crime. In the future, it appears probable that the
Council's influence in Eastern Europe, and thus, the European regime,
130. For the Interpol Resolution, see Resolution Adopted by 'Working Group on
Assets Derived from Crime-St. Cloud, France, April 1989; see also Assembly Passes
and Begins Implementation of Currency Information Resolution, 6 INT'L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 96 (Mar. 1990). For the Basle Committee, see Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Prevention of Criminal Use of Banking System,
Draft Code of Conduct (B.S./88/52 May 9, 1988); see also Zagaris & Bornheim,
Foreign and International Money Laundering Laws, MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCE-
MENT LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS (Criminal Justice Section, A.B.A., Oct.
26-27, 1989).
131. STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 52, at art. 3.
132. See Nilsson, supra note 50, at 6.
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will continue to grow.
C. The Schengen Accord
In addition to developments in the context of the European Com-
munities and the Council of Europe, international cooperation has sur-
faced in Europe in other areas. The Schengen Accord, signed June 19,
1990, by five countries, is one example. 133
Generally, this accord provides that signatory countries will
strengthen cooperation between police and justice officials in the signa-
tory countries. This effort will formalize the already existing informal
cooperation that allows police to pursue criminal suspects across their
national borders.3 Also, signatories agree to begin working on the
simplification of information exchange and extradition procedures and
the harmonization of gun-control legislation.
Regarding illicit drug trafficking, several articles of the accord ad-
dress the issue specifically. For instance, one article provides for the
establishment of a permanent working group to examine the problems
of and design solutions to illicit drug trafficking,'3 5 while another provi-
sion serves to supplement the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention
and efforts of the Communities such as the directive discussed above. 3 6
It is anticipated that more countries will be signing the accord in
the near future.37 Expanding cooperative efforts in this manner,
outside the framework of the Council and Communities, will add to
and further define Europe's international regime. Moreover, develop-
ments of this type serve as further proof of the flexible nature of
regimes.138
133. Convention to Apply the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985. Among
the Countries of the Benelux Economic Union, Federal Republic of Germany, the
French Republic Relative to the Gradual Suppression of Border Controls, signed on
June 19, 1990, in Schengen [hereinafter Accord]. For a discussion of the Schengen
Accord's enforcement provisions, see Five EC Members Reach Agreement on Schengen
Accord, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 226 (June 1990) [hereinafter Five EC Mem-
bers]. The five signatories are Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and
Germany.
134. In some cases, police officers from one country will be able to chase criminal
suspects up to ten kilometers (6.21 miles) into a neighboring country. Five EC Mem-
bers, supra note 133.
135. Accord, supra note 133, at art. 70.
136. Accord, supra note 133, at art. 71.
137. Two likely candidates for signature are Spain and Italy. Id.
138. See W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSIONS-IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN REGIME
A. As a Model for Other Regional Groups
The study of the European regime's approach to illicit narcotics
trafficking and money laundering has significance for other regional
groups, because many other regional groups are contemplating estab-
lishing regimes and are searching for the proper models. ]Kn light of the
changes in international money movement and illicit narcotics traffick-
ing, other regional groups, such as the Caribbean Common Market and
Community (CARICOM), have agreed on the need to take action
against these problems. However, their proposals are not yet as definite
and sophisticated as the actions of the European Communities or the
Council of Europe.1' 9
Nevertheless, the need for international cooperation is just as evi-
dent, if not more so, in groups like CARICOM. None of the members
of CARICOM have the means to take unilateral action because, unless
they take action in a uniform manner, the countries taking action will
likely lose economically as illicit profits move to their nonconforming
neighbors. 140 In this economically depressed region, such a result might
be difficult to justify politically. To facilitate the necessary cooperation,
the institutional models of a European Committee on Crime Problems
have been suggested for the Americas: the establishment of an Ameri-
cas Committee on Crime Problems with the Assistant Ministers of Jus-
tice and their assistants meeting on a regular basis to discuss and take
action and cooperate against drugs, money laundering, and a panoply
of criminal justice problems.14'
139. See, e.g., the communiques of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community from July 3-7, 1989 (support for
the establishment of a multilateral force under the aegis of the United Nations to pro-
vide assistance in intelligence and interdiction of illicit narcotics and for the creation of
an international criminal court to investigate and adjudicate criminal responsibility of
persons allegedly engaged in drug trafficking); and the communiques; of the Eleventh
Heads of Government Meeting on August 2, 1990 (support for the development of
mechanisms to protect the regional international banking and financial systems from
subversion by the international drug traffickers). See Caribbean Heads of Government
Issue Communique, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 336 (1990).
140. See the excellent discussion by Sanders in The Drug Problem: Social and
Economic Effects-Policy Options for the Caribbean, 3 CARIBBEAN AFF. 18 (1990).
141. For a discussion of this idea, see Zagaris & Papavizas, Using the Organiza-
tion of American States to Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money
Laundering, 57 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 118 (1986). For further discussion of
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Proper consideration of the appropriate models requires an under-
standing of the origins and status of existing international regimes and
organizations. Moreover, a consideration of regimes is at a premium in
the Caribbean where within CARICOM there exists dynamic subre-
gional groupings, such as the Organization of East Caribbean States
(OECS), containing still another informal sub-sub-regional group, the
Leeward Islands Group.1 4
2
B. On International Cooperation with the United States
The current United States' posture towards international coopera-
tion in criminal matters is not wholly encouraging. Recent remarks by
William P. Barr, a Deputy Attorney General at the Justice Depart-
ment, make clear that the advocates of hard power, unilateral action
have a voice in the current administration. For example, in Mr. Barr's
opinion, the United States is free to seize foreign criminals (particu-
larly drug traffickers) and bring them to the United States for trial.
According to Mr. Barr, the authority for such acts is provided by do-
mestic laws, regardless of customary international law to the
contrary.143
However, soft power, cooperative approaches are also being pur-
sued by the Justice Department. Mark Richard, the Director of Inter-
national Affairs, has expressed enthusiasm for updating treaty relations
with other countries, while simultaneously continuing to work with ex-
isting treaties.1 4 4
Clearly, a hard power approach to criminal matters in Western
Europe would be an extreme and untenable position. If the United
States is to develop an effective international criminal policy with re-
gard to Europe, it will have to develop more effective ways of working
with Western Europe's international regime. Recently, the United
recent developments in the Caribbean, see Zagaris, Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force Aruba Meeting Presages Cooperation by Caribbean Jurisdictions, 6 INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 217 (1990).
142. See W. FELD & R. JORDAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text. Also, in
this regard, the Communities and the Council of Europe have examined some of the
benefits and difficulties of cooperation between regional groups. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, Commission Communication to the Council on relations between
the Community and the Council of Europe, Brussels, March 8, 1989, COM(89) 124
final [hereinafter Commission of the European Communities].
143. Anderson, Fighting the International Drug War, A.B.A.J. 24 (Jan. 1991).
144. Id. at 25.
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States has experienced difficulties in working with this regime,14 5 and
future difficulties appear likely.146 Though the United States has shown
some interest in working with the European regime,147 it cannot be as-
sured of an effective policy in Europe without a more aggressive com-
mitment to work with the existing regime. Such a commitment requires
that United States practitioners and policymakers familiarize them-
selves with the regime.
C. On Future Western European Cooperation in Criminal
Matters
Though the European regime's sophistication is due in part to the
active sponsorship of both the Council of Europe and the European
Communities, this dual sponsorship is not without attendant difficulties.
Both organizations have distinctly separate agendas, and. the potential
for redundant and conflicting approaches to cooperation in criminal
matters is real.
In acknowledgement of the need to coordinate the activities of the
two organizations, formal structures have appeared to ensure that dia-
logue between the two groups is maintained. 48 The most significant
structure is the relationship established between the Commission of the
European Communities and the Interdepartmental Working Party of
the Council of Europe. It is anticipated that this relationship can pro-
vide for a "regular comparison" of the activities of the two
organizations. 149
However, structural differences in the two organizations may still
prove problematic. The Council of Europe pursues its objectives largely
through conventions and recommendations. The Communities, on the
other hand, emphasizes legislative actions. Disagreements over which
methods to use when addressing particular problems may arise. The
future of Western European cooperation in criminal matters will de-
pend in part on the ability of the regime to accommodate these compet-
145. See, e.g., Breitnemoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: the Soer-
ing Case, 11 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 845 (1990); Quigley, Death Row as a Violation of
Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1990).
146. Current U.S. forfeiture laws may not be respected by Western Europe.
Nilsson and Zagaris, A.B.A. National Institute Considers International and Foreign
Law Aspects of Asset Forfeiture 435, 437, (Dec. 1990).
147. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
148. See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 142.
149. Id. at 4.
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ing approaches to cooperation. In this regard, the flexible nature of re-
gimes and the current spirit of cooperation between the two
organizations provide a basis for optimism.
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